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 Voice input for authentication  
ABSTRACT 
Recent years have seen a proliferation of systems designed to respond to voice, e.g., 
smart speakers, smartphones, and other voice-activated devices. Such systems are convenient 
and intuitive to use. However, they also open the possibility for malicious actors to gain control 
of sensitive information through fraudulent use of speech commands. For example, a malicious 
actor can spoof the voice recognition system through a recording of the user’s voice or by using 
a computer to synthesize the speech mimicking the user. The techniques of this disclosure 
thwart such attacks by providing a random phrase for the user to repeat and verifying the 
resulting audio and transcription for authenticity. Spoofed audio sounds choppy and exhibits 
sharp transitions, while authentic audio is smooth and lacks unnatural artifacts. A trained 
machine learning model is used to tell the difference. 
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 BACKGROUND 
 Voice recognition systems are increasingly integrated into consumer devices, with the 
result that systems designed to respond to voice, e.g., smartphones, smart speakers, smart 
assistants, internet-of-things (IoT) devices, etc., are now nearly ubiquitous. Such voice 
recognition and response systems match users based on a given voice fingerprint. Although 
convenient and intuitive to use, use of voice recognition technologies open up the possibility of 
malicious actors fraudulently using the voice user interface to perform unauthorized actions. 
For example, a malicious actor may compile a unique query in a user’s voice by splicing 
together unrelated voice recordings of the user. Alternatively, a malicious actor could use a 
computer to synthesize text that approximates the user’s speech. For sensitive applications of 
voice-enabled systems, e.g., financial transactions, such spoofing can enable a malicious actor 
to perform undesirable actions. 
DESCRIPTION 
The techniques of this disclosure enable users to protect sensitive actions from being 
performed over a voice user interface without authorization. Prior to responding to or 
completing a user request, the voice user interface asks the user to utter a randomly generated 
phrase. The audio of the user response is checked using trained machine learning models to 
verify validity of the transcription and smoothness of the audio. With a spoofed audio track, 
e.g., where several audio recordings are spliced together, the audio sounds choppy or exhibits 
sharp changes at transition points. These types of artifacts are identified using the trained 
machine learning model, and if detected, are used to reject the user’s request. The techniques 
described herein, to authenticate users over a voice interface, are referred to as audio 
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 CAPTCHAs (“Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans 
Apart”). 
Voice input from the user is obtained and utilized for the purpose of responding to user 
commands. Recording of user uttered speech, if necessary, is performed only if permitted by 
the user. Such recordings are utilized for the purpose of responding to user requests, and are 
retained for a limited period of time, if permitted by the user. 
 
Fig. 1: Authentication over a voice user interface 
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 Fig. 1 illustrates authentication over a voice user interface, per techniques of this 
disclosure. A user (102), claiming authenticity, queries or requests access to a device using a 
voice user interface (104). The voice user interface responds by issuing a challenge (106) to 
prove authenticity, e.g., requesting the user to repeat a randomly generated phrase. The phrase 
is designed to last only for a few seconds and includes words that typically don’t occur together 
in normal usage. These attributes of the challenge phrase make it difficult for a malicious actor 
to generate a matching audio clip that sounds smooth. 
The user utters the phrase (108). The user has a small time window, e.g., a few seconds, 
to complete utterance of the challenge phrase. A small time window for response increases the 
difficulty for a malicious actor to splice together or synthesize mimicked speech. The voice user 
interface receives the uttered phrase (110) and tests it for authenticity (112).  
Authenticity is tested by checking for smoothness within the captured audio, and 
checking for unnatural artifacts such as sharp transitions within the captured audio. Natural 
speech by a true user is smooth and free of sharp transitions. A trained machine learning model 
determines if the received phrase originates from previously recorded clips by identifying 
whether the audio came from a person or from an electronic speaker. Metrics such volume, 
frequency, noise levels, etc. are used to make the determination relating to authenticity.  
If the captured audio is determined to have originated from a true user, then the user’s 
access request is admitted (116), and the correct audio response to the challenge added to the 
training set of the user’s voice fingerprint model (114), if permitted by the user. Addition of the 
correct audio response to the training set continually improves the accuracy of the user’s voice 
fingerprint. If authentication fails, the user is denied access (118). 
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 Further to the descriptions above, a user may be provided with controls allowing the 
user to make an election as to both if and when systems, programs or features described herein 
may enable collection of user information (e.g., information about a user’s social network, 
social actions or activities, profession, a user’s preferences, or a user’s current location), and if 
the user is sent content or communications from a server.  In addition, certain data may be 
treated in one or more ways before it is stored or used, so that personally identifiable 
information is removed. For example, a user’s identity may be treated so that no personally 
identifiable information can be determined for the user, or a user’s geographic location may be 
generalized where location information is obtained (such as to a city, ZIP code, or state level), 
so that a particular location of a user cannot be determined. Thus, the user may have control 
over what information is collected about the user, how that information is used, and what 
information is provided to the user. 
CONCLUSION 
 This disclosure provides techniques that protect devices with voice user interfaces 
against unauthorized access. When a user requests access or issues a command to a device over 
a voice interface, the techniques request the user to repeat a phrase comprising randomly 
selected words. The phrase is designed such that it is difficult to artificially synthesize without 
introducing artifacts. A true user uttering the phrase is identified as such by a trained machine 
learning model that tests for attributes such as smoothness of captured audio, presence or 
absence of artifacts, etc. Upon successful verification, the user’s request is admitted.  
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